Publications > Cahiers (English)> N° 38, 1st term 1996

• [Pluriactivity in agriculture : hidden heterogeneity], M.-J. CARNEIRO
• [Labour allocation on the farm : an application of the agricultural household model],
  C. BENJAMIN
• Farm household production under CAP reform : the impact of borrowing restrictions,
  E. PHIMISTER
• [Externalities and Common Agricultural Policy : A Coasian approach], D. VERMERSCH

Pluriactivité agricole : l'hétérogénéité caché
[Pluriactivity in agriculture : hidden heterogeneity]

M.-J. CARNEIRO (Université fédérale rurale de Rio de Janeiro et Département d'anthropologie, Université fédérale Fluniuse, CP 1050, rue Miguel de Frias, Icariá 24220 Niterói, RJ, Brésil)

In : Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, n° 38, 1996, pp 5-36

Summary : Today the non agricultural activities performed by small farmers are known as "pluriactivity". However, this category describes different phenomena whose meanings vary according to historic and socio-economic contexts and also to several authors. Based on the analysis of the existing literature, the author argues that the notion of "pluriactivity" is full of impressions and so do not contribute to qualify the phenomena it designates. The absence of an heuristic content in this category suggests the construction of new objects no more centered on individual actions but on the conditions for social reproduction of small farmers families. The theoretical discussion is illustrated by the data of a research carried out in a small rural village in the French Alpes.

Key-words : pluriactivity, family production, social reproduction, mountain farming, France.

L'affectation du travail dans les exploitations agricoles : une application du modèle du ménage producteur et consommateur
[Labour allocation on the farm : an application of the agricultural household model]

C. BENJAMIN (Station d'Economie et sociologie rurales de l'INRA, Unité PAM, 65 rue de St Brieuc, 35042 Rennes cedex)

In : Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, n° 38, 1996, pp 37-60

Summary : This paper is based on the neo-classical farm-household model. The aim is to show how this theoretical framework allows to characterize all the labour decisions of the farm household : the decision to use hired labour on farm and the decision to work off farm. Indeed, these decisions are joint and the model takes into account their simultaneity. An important feature of the analysis arises from the fact that we consider the labour market might be imperfect : hence, the cost of hired labour can be different from the off-farm wage rate. The farm household is defined as an economic entity and is assumed to maximise its utility function subject to income, time and non-negativity constraints. On-farm and off-farm family labour are assumed to be perfect substitutes in the utility function as well as family labour and hired labour in the production function despite their differential opportunity costs. The farm household model characterizes the rule for off-farm participation : the household will not work off farm when its marginal value of time from not participating in the off-farm labour market (its reservation wage) is greater than the wage rate offered off -farm. Hired labour is used on farm when the marginal value of hired labour equals its cost. Rational choice by agricultural households lead them to choose differential labour strategies and thus to belong to different labour regimes. The reduced form of the model defines six labour regimes depending on the value of the labour variables. The model is illustrated with the use of functional forms (Cobb-Douglas forms) for the utility and the production functions. This example allows to derive the different regimes and to point out on the case when the production decisions depend on the preferences of the household i.e. when the recursivity of the household behaviour does not hold. Furthermore the impact of the new Common Agricultural Policy on the labour decisions of the farm-household is studied. The comparative static of the reservation wage with respect to the instruments used in the new CAP regime allow the formation of hypotheses regarding how CAP will affect labour decisions.

Key-words : farm household, labour, model, utility function, production function.

Farm household production under CAP reform : the impact of borrowing restrictions
[Production des ménages agricoles et réforme de la PAC : impact des contraintes financières]

E. PHIMISTER (Department of Economics, University of Aberdeen, AB9 2TY, UK)

In : Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, n° 38, 1996, pp 61-78

Summary : This paper examines the potential impact of borrowing constraints on the production responses of farm households to certain aspects of the MacSharry reforms. A life cycle model of the farm household is calibrated for specialized cereal producers in France and used to simulate the output effects of cereal price reductions, set-aside and compensation payments. The responses of this model are contrasted with a recursive model where production is independent of consumption. The results show that the output effects resulting from the policy changes are always less negative in the farm household model than in the recursive model and may, in many cases, be positive.

Key-words : life cycle, simulation, MacSharry, output.

Externalités et politique agricole commune : l'approche coasienne
[Externalities and Common agricultural policy : the Coasian approach]

D. VERMERSCH (Station d'Economie et sociologie rurales de l'INRA, 65, rue de St Brieuc,
35042 Rennes cedex)

In : Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, n° 38, 1996, pp 79-105

Summary : The interpretation and analysis of externalities presented by Coase (1960) is applied to the problem of agricultural externalities and to the consecutive answers provided by the new trends of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). We first discuss the classical distinction between technological externalities and pecuniary externalities. This is related to the second best situation of the European agricultural economy which is precised in the paper. Assuming this kind of situation, the Coasian analysis considers four possible solutions of internalization that we try to illustrate through the agricultural context. In most cases, marketing the property rights (1) seems to be difficult, given high transaction costs and the nature of agricultural externalities. The coordination of the agricultural activities inside the farm or between farms (2) was pre-existent to the large development of agricultural harmful effects. This second solution needs at the present time a substantial variation of relative prices in order to promote for example sustainable agricultural technologies. Direct government regulation (3) through administrative agencies hardly depends on the microeconomic farm efficiency. A further alternative is to do nothing (4) about the externality problem at all, given the costs of the preceding solutions. Until the early eighties public-decision makers were encline to prefer the laissez-faire approach. Finally CAP and the May 92 reform are viewed as an internalization instrument combining successively the preceeding coasian solutions. The new agricultural support policy rather provides implicit producing rights to the farmers than a payment for amenities. This last purpose is not in contradiction with the Coasian approach. Indeed the public-decision maker arranges producing rights and liability rules linked to the technological and pecuniary externalities given he wants to maintain the comparative advantages of the national and/or European agricultural economy.

Key-words : Coase, common agricultural policy, technological externalities, pecuniary externalities, property rights.