Publications > Cahiers (English)> N° 64, 3 rd term 2002

• Le rôle controversé de la fiscalité forestière dans la gestion des forêts tropicales. L’état du débat et les perspectives en Afrique centrale, A. KARSENTY texte au format PDF
  [The controversial role of forest taxation regimes on tropical forests management practices. Issues and perspectives in Central Africa]
  
• Willingness to pay for drinking water in the Sahara : the case of Douentzain Mali,
  P. CALKINS, B. LARUE, M. VÉZINA texte au format PDF
  
• Impact des variables et pratiques agronomiques sur la réduction des dommages : le cas de la pomme de terre au Québec, R. ROMAIN, R. LAMBERT, R. MICHAUD, C. LAPOINTE
  [Impact of agronomic and management variables on damage reduction in potato production in Quebec]
  
• Instruments économiques de politique environnementale et choix technique du pollueur. Le traitement des eaux résiduaires dans l’industrie de vinification, S. FAROLFI, M. TIDBALL
  [Economic instruments for environmental policy and polluter’s technical choice. Wastewater treatment in the wine industry]
  

Le rôle controversé de la fiscalité forestière dans la gestion des forêts tropicales. L’état du débat et les perspectives en Afrique centrale
[The controversial role of forest taxation regimes on tropical forests management practices. Issues and perspectives in Central Africa]

Alain KARSENTY* (* CIRAD-Forêt, Campus de Baillarguet, TA 10/D, 34398 Montpellier Cedex 5 - e-mail : alain.karsenty@cirad.fr)

In : Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, n° 64, 2002, pp 5-36

Summary - The effects of forest taxation regimes on logging and management practices in moist tropical forests have been assessed in opposite ways. In the meantime, donors are asking developing countries to reform their existing forest taxation regimes to improve the overall forest sector management. The debate stands on two different aspects : the level and the distribution of the forest economic rent on one hand, and the balance between the upstream and the downstream part of the wood commodity chain on the other hand. In Central Africa, the amplitude of the forest rent has fluctuated during the last 30 years. If the influence of high rent levels on management practices is uncertain, one can say however that its lamination due to the low level of timber prices on the international markets led to an expansion of bad management practices. The recovery since the mid-1990’s and the new regulation constraints have led a handful of forest operators to invest in management plan preparation. But the institutional instability and the endemic corruption in several countries within the sub-region are also key factors for the decision process toward the choice of management practices. What is at stake is may be less the absolute level of taxes and royalties than the choice of optimal taxes combinations, coupled with new regime of access to the forest resources. In that view, forest control, taxes, and other foreseeable economic instruments – as transferable log exports quotas – are acting as a system. As the main forest companies in Central Africa are vertically integrated, analysis should take into consideration the industrial wood processing and its associated innovation potential, which leads to a differentiation between the economic rent level amongst companies. On that basis, the taxation regime, backed by regulations enforcement, can contribute to stir up the selection process leading to increase the general level of efficiency within the forest sector.

Key-words : forest taxation regime, forest royalties,management of tropical forest, Central Africa,forest economic rent, environmental taxes.

Willingness to pay for drinking water in the Sahara : the case of Douentzain Mali
[Consentement à payer pour de l’eau potable au Sahara : le cas de Douentza au Mali]

Peter CALKINS, Bruno LARUE, Marc VÉZINA* (* Centre de Recherche en Économie Agroalimentaire (CRÉA), Université Laval, Ste-Foy, Québec, Canada, G1K 7P4 - e-mail : peter.calkins@eac.ulaval.ca - bruno.larue@eac.ulaval.ca)

In : Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, n° 64, 2002, pp 37-56

Summary - This study compares two methods of predicting the willingness to pay for drinking-water delivery systems in the semi-urban Sahara as a function of the hypothetical characteristics of possible water delivery points. The first, a linear regression model, predicts the monetary amount a household should be willing to pay for each bucket of water from the source. The second, a LOGIT model, explains the decision to purchase water or not. Both methods are based on the full-price budget constrained model of standard demand theory — which explains quantity demanded as a function of prices and the opportunity cost of time spent on consumption. The most consistently significant explanatory variable in our empirical models is the relative distance to the planned new source compared to the best existing source.

Key-words : drinking water, willingness to pay, auctions, Mali.

Impact des variables et pratiques agronomiques sur la réduction des dommages : le cas de la pomme de terre au Québec
[Impact of agronomic and management variables on damage reduction in potato production in Quebec]

Robert ROMAIN*, Rémy LAMBERT*, Renée MICHAUD**, Claude Lapointe* (* Centre de recherche en économie agroalimentaire (CRÉA), Université Laval, Pavillon Comtois, cité universitaire, Sainte-Foy, Québec, Canada - e-mail : robert.romain@eac.ulaval.ca - remy.lambert@eac.ulaval.ca - CLapoint@NRCan.gc.ca - ** Institut des nutraceutiques et des aliments fonctionnels, Université Laval, Pavillon Comtois, cité universitaire, Sainte-Foy, Québec, Canada - e-mail : renee.michaud@fsaa.ulaval.ca)

In : Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, n° 64, 2002, pp 57-82

Summary -This study proposes an approach similar to that of Lichtenberg and Zilberman to model the impact of control agents (pesticides, herbicides) on potato production. We estimate simultaneously a marketable output equation as well as three damage abatement functions. Empirical results show that fertilising elements (nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium and magnesium) do not have statistically significant impacts on the potential output of potatoes. Significant effects are obtained in the damage abatement functions but only for phosphorus and potassium. These latter variables show opposite effects in altering damages caused by the small size of the tuber. Hence phosphorus increases them while potassium reduces them. Several variables reflecting alternative management practices have also been included in the model but only few of them are statistically significant.

Key-words : potatoes, control agent, abatement function.

Instruments économiques de politique environnementale et choix technique du pollueur. Le traitement des eaux résiduaires dans l’industrie de vinification
[Economic instruments for environmental policy and polluter’s technical choice. Wastewater treatment in the wine industry]

Stefano FAROLFI*, Mabel TIDBALL** (* Cirad-Tera, Programme Espaces et Ressources, Campus international de Baillarguet-TA 60/15, 34398 Montpellier Cedex 5 - e-mail : sfarolfi@postino.up.ac.za - ** INRA-LAMETA, 2 place Viala, 34060 Montpellier - e-mail : tidball@ensam.inra.fr)

In : Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, n° 64, 2002, pp 82-109

Summary - Winery wastewater pollution can be reduced by a Water Agency through economic instruments such as taxes and subsidies. According to the « efficiency without optimality » approach, which aims at reaching a sub-optimal environmental objective at the lowest cost to Society, these instruments should act as an incentive for firms to adopt the best available pollution control technology. As there exists little knowledge of pollution damage functions, the computation of the water agencies’pollution charges is based on pollution abatement costs instead. In order to determine the level of charges, the Water Agency first computes the necessary expenses in terms of investment subsidies (for public and industrial treatment plants) and then determines the costs required to balance its budget. In defining its policy objectives, the Water Agency acts under conditions of information asymmetry. For instance, the Agency does not really know the pollution abatement cost at the sector level or for different kinds of technology. As a result, its policy, although effective because pushing the producers to invest, is inefficient : the cost to Society is higher than the lowest possible cost, and there is a poor redistribution of subsidies among the polluters. In order to reduce this asymmetry of information of the Water Agency (regarding pollution abatement costs), we propose a sector-based approach. This paper studies the wine producers’response — his choice of a wastewater abatement technology — to the use of economic instruments defined by the Water Agency in the south of France. It is assumed that the producers/polluters behave rationally and minimise their pollution control costs. In the second part of the paper, we will look at the individual firm, underlying the importance of fixed costs for the choice of a wastewater control strategy. Consequently we will propose a modified model of polluter’s behaviour in which fixed costs are considered and the underlying cost function follows the law of diminishing returns. The analysis of the individual choice between bearing pollution abatement costs (technical investment) and paying pollution costs (taxes) allows us to examine, in addition, the possibility of a partial treatment of wastewater.

Key-words : economic incentives, environmental policy, water policy, wine industry,
technical choice.