Publications > Cahiers (English)> N° 74, 1st term 2005
- Les
exploitations agricoles polonaises à la veille de l'élargissement
: efficacité des facteurs de production et structure financière,
L. LATRUFFE
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[Polish farms on the eve of accession : production factors efficiency and financial structure]
- Analyse
exploratoire de quelques stratégies de fourniture "non publique"
des biens "publics", Ch. DÉPRÉS, G. GROLLEAU,
N. MZOUGHI
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[The "non-public" provision of "public" goods : an exploratory analysis]
NORMES ET MARCHÉS
: LE CAS DE LA VIANDE (XVIIIe-XXe SIÈCLES)
Présentation par A. Stanziani
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- Les
formes d'intervention des pouvoirs publics dans l'approvisionnement
en bestiaux de Paris : la Caisse de Poissy de l'Ancien Régime
au Second Empire, S. LETEUX
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[Permanence of the Cattle Supply System in Paris : the Caisse de Poissy from the Old Regime to the Second Empire] - La
construction institutionnelle de la concurrence. Le cas du marché
de la viande à Paris au XIXe siècle, A. STANZIANI
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[The institutional building of competition. The case of the meat market in 19th century Paris]
- La
construction socio-juridique de la traçabilité des viandes
bovines, entre politique sanitaire et organisation du marché
(1960-2002), L. PIET
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[The legal and social construction of traceability in the beef chain : health policy and market organization (1960-2002)]
COMPTES RENDUS DE LECTURE
W. COLEMAN, W. GRANT and T. JOSLING, Agriculture in the New Global Economy, by M. Petit ; Ph. CHAUDAT, Les mondes du vin. Ethnologie des vignerons d'Arbois, by O. Jacquet ; K. ANDERSON (ed.), The World's Wine Markets : Globalization at Work, by K. Moulton
Les exploitations agricoles polonaises à la veille de l'élargissement
: efficacité des facteurs de production et structure financière
[Polish farms on the eve of accession : production factors efficiency
and financial structure]
Laure LATRUFFE * (* INRA-Rennes, Unité ESR, 4, Allée Bobierre, CS 61103, 35011 Rennes cedex et Université Paris X - e-mail : Laure.Latruffe@rennes.inra.fr)
In : Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, n° 74, 2005, pp 5-25
Summary - Among the Central and Eastern European Countries that entered the European Union (EU) in May 2004, Poland has the biggest farming sector. The aim of the paper is to investigate the economic structure of individual Polish farms and to estimate their technical efficiency with the Data Envelopment Analysis method, using the most recent data. The objective is also to identify the main determinants of this efficiency. The major contribution of the study is to include financial indicators as potential determinants, using a two-stage regression model to account for potential endogeneity with the technical efficiency score. Results suggest that Polish farms specialised in livestock production are the most efficient. Moreover, besides the farms' small size and low degree of market integration, the main constraints to efficiency deal with capital, which is obsolete, and labour, which is for the most part unskilled. Numerous lessons can be drawn from such a study that can help EU authorities targeting and assessing common policies in Poland in terms of improvement of farms technical efficiency.
Key-words : Poland, farms, technical efficiency, Data Envelopment Analysis, indebtedness.
Analyse exploratoire de quelques stratégies de fourniture "non
publique" des biens "publics"
[The "non-public" provision of "public" goods : an
exploratory analysis]
Christophe DÉPRÉS *, Gilles GROLLEAU **, Naoufel MZOUGHI ** (* UMR INRA-ENESAD (CESAER) et Cemagref, 24, avenue des Landais, BP 5085, 63172 Aubière Cedex - e-mail : christophe.depres@enesad.inra.fr. ** UMR INRA-ENESAD (CESAER), 26, rue du Dr. Petitjean, BP 87999, 21079 Dijon Cedex - e-mail : grolleau@enesad.inra.fr, mzoughi@enesad.inra.fr)
In : Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, n° 74, 2005, pp 27-45
Summary - The "public"
or "collective" nature of some goods and services has often
legitimated the intervention of the "visible hand" of the state.
The new institutional economics, initiated by Coase, raises objections
against this rationale. First, several heterodox authors question the
nature of goods and they show that the 'public or private nature' is socially
constructed at several stages, i.e. financing, production and access.
Consequently, economics implications resulting from this distinction are
seriously contested. Second, Coase and his followers challenge the public
goods rationale for government production based on economic efficiency
grounds. The new institutional economics proposes to identify, in a comparative
way, the real institutional arrangements likely to minimize the whole
production and transaction costs. Coasean economics does not mean the
absence of state intervention, but rather redefines the modalities of
this intervention, to enable the achievement of benefits proper to private
arrangements. Government intervention does not necessarily imply that
public authorities will deal with all the aspects that can be distinguished
in the provision of "public" goods. Transaction costs economics
show the diversity of arrangements that may emerge on a continuum ranging
from the "all-state" to the 'all-market' approach. We study
three institutional arrangements likely to lead to non-public provision
of public goods: the association of private benefits, collective organization
and contractualisation. We analyze the modalities of public intervention
and stress the degree of mixing in institutional arrangements. Some examples
are presented, mainly in the agricultural sector, where the 'collective'
nature of some environmental productions has considerably justified the
'heavy' intervention of the state.
Key-words : non public provision, collective goods, new institutional economics.
NORMES ET MARCHÉS
: LE CAS DE LA VIANDE (XVIIIe-XXe SIÈCLES)
Présentation par A. Stanziani
Les formes d'intervention des pouvoirs publics dans l'approvisionnement
en bestiaux de Paris : la Caisse de Poissy de l'Ancien Régime au
Second Empire
[Permanence of the Cattle Supply System in Paris : the Caisse de Poissy
from the Old Regime to the Second Empire]
Sylvain LETEUX * (* CERSATES, UMR 8529-CNRS, Université Lille 3, Pont de Bois, BP 60149, 59653 Villeneuve d'Ascq cedex - e-mail : s.leteux@mageos.com)
In : Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, n° 74, 2005, pp 49-78
Summary - Héritière d'une longue tradition d'intervention des autorités publiques pour la régulation des marchés d'approvisionnement en bestiaux de Paris, la Caisse de Poissy connaît de nombreuses vicissitudes sous l'Ancien Régime, au gré des priorités du pouvoir monarchique et/ou municipal et des pressions exercées tantôt par les bouchers, tantôt par les herbagers. Créée avant tout pour garantir le paiement entre les bouchers et les marchands de bestiaux, la Caisse est aussi une source de revenus non négligeable pour la Ville de Paris. Pendant toute son existence, la Caisse est l'objet d'un vif débat entre les partisans de la liberté des échanges et ceux qui réclament le maintien d'un système, censé garantir un approvisionnement régulier de la capitale. C'est l'évolution des termes de ce débat sur le long terme, depuis l'Ancien Régime jusqu'au Second Empire, qui est intéressante à suivre, notamment aux périodes où le système est provisoirement suspendu (1776, 1791, 1825).
Key-words : food supply in Paris, debate on liberalism, free trade, Old Regime economy, cattle dealing.
La construction institutionnelle de la concurrence. Le cas du marché
de la viande à Paris au XIXe siècle
[The institutional building of competition. The case of the meat market
in 19th century Paris]
Alessandro STANZIANI
* (* IDHE ( UMR CNRS), ENS , Bâtiment Laplace, 61, avenue du
Président Wilson, 94235 Cachan cedex - e-mail : Stanziani.Alessandro@idhe.ens-cachan.fr)
In : Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, n° 74, 2004, pp 79-107
Summary - In Paris, the market of the meat, as under the Old Regime, is regulated up through 1858. Throughout this length of time, regulatory norms coexist with an extremely liberal contract law. On the contrary, between 1858 and 1914, liberalization of prices and free entry on the market go along with the introduction of serious constraints on contractual will. This is to say that state policies and governance include micro (contracts rules) as well as macroeconomic rules. The legal qualification of public action is fundamental as it fixes the procedures of rules enforcement and, thus, economic actors' legal-economic opportunities and behaviors. This interaction between rules and the market is particularly clear in the process of products qualification; if commercial customs integrate legal provisions, at the same time they cannot be evoked and enforced out of an explicit reference in official rules. The question consists in understanding the relative place of formal rules and conventions. These considerations lead the author to raise doubts on the traditional chronological as well as logical opposition between free market and regulation. The paper will argue that economic standards and rules are neither in opposition (neo-classical argument), nor complementary (neo-institutionnalist approach) to the market, but they are constitutive of it.
Key-words : competition, regulation, quality, contracts.
La construction socio-juridique de la traçabilité
des viandes bovines, entre politique sanitaire et organisation du marché
(1960-2002)
[The legal and social construction of traceability in the beef chain :
health policy and market organization (1960-2002)]
Laetitia PIET * (* Centre nantais de sociologie, faculté des Lettres, rue de la Censive du Tertre, BP 81227, 44312 Nantes cedex - e-mail : laetitiapiet@wanadoo.fr)
In : Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, n° 74, 2005, pp 108-138
Summary - The traceability of beef is commonly read as an answer to new consumer requirements relating to safety which emerged after 1996. The BSE crisis led indeed to an extended change in the whole beef chain. However most of the norms and legal procedures which still allow the traceability preceded the crisis. The purpose of this paper is to study the tension between the novelty of this device and the continuance of the rules that support it, through the analysis of their social and legal production. In the 1960s, the legal methods of following-up meat and animals were oriented towards the modernization of beef-market and of cattle-breeding practices. But the connection of these two sides was broken at the slaughter-house level. This break conveyed the representation according to which an animal in good health gave wholesome meat. After 1975, the increased use of veterinary drugs, especially of growth-hormones, called into question the fairness of the market value of meat as well as its safety for consumers. The increasing amount of litigations prompted the construction of scientific and accounting rules which ensured the link between the meat on sale and the inputs used for its production. At that time, the conviction emerged that breeding practices had great influence upon the safety of meat. In the 1990s, traceability was used for both signalling higher-quality meat to consumers and controlling the grant of European quality-targeted subsidies. In addition, the follow-up of cattle was extended for the purpose of health policy towards BSE. This crisis urged on the linkage of these commercial and health aspects of traceability: it stood out as a market regulation device able to articulate the control of trading and a health-policy securing the safety of livestock products. Finally, the evolution of traceability depends on the way institutional and occupational actors seize on the legal rules of follow-up in their economic activities and also on the changes in the representation of health risk. Thus, the health policy conducted through law is always linked to market function.
Key-words : beef market, follow-up of animals and meat, traceability, growth-hormones, sanitary risk, law.